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FINDING A NEW PATH: USING THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 
TO PROTECT THE VOTING RIGHTS OF RETURNING CITIZENS 
Ebony Love* 
“[W]e are imprisoned in a political cage—to accept matters 
as they are. I refuse to do so, because the political terrain as 
it is currently laid out has left black and other vulnerable 
communities throughout this country in shambles. I want to 
choose another path. I want to remake American democracy, 
because whatever this is, it ain’t democracy.” 
-Eddie S. Glaude, Democracy in Black1 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2018 general election made history when Florida joined 46 other 
states in automatically restoring voting rights for returning citizens2 
convicted of felonies.3 Amendment Four on the 2018 Florida ballot 
amended the language of Florida Constitution Article 6 § 4 to restore the 
voting rights of some felons “upon completion of all terms of [their] 
sentence[s] including parole or probation.”4 Individuals convicted of 
“murder or a felony sexual offense” would not get their voting rights 
automatically restored.5  
The ballot measure in Florida had bipartisan support.6 Organizations 
that supported the measure generally argued Amendment Four provided 
returning citizens a second chance to fully participate in society.7 They 
also supported the measure because of its potential reach: Amendment 
Four enfranchised “more people at once than any single initiative since 
women’s suffrage.”8 Most important, Amendment Four would help 
alleviate racial disparities in enfranchisement.9 The majority of Florida’s 
returning citizens are white.10 However, black people were 
“disproportionately affected . . . [because m]ore than one in five black 
voters [could not] vote in Florida, compared with about one in 10 voters 
in the state’s general population [ ]and one in 40 nationwide.”11 
By February 2019, the Florida Legislature limited the effectiveness of 
Amendment Four when the Senate Ethics and Elections Committee 
 
 2. The term “returning citizens” is deliberately used in place of “felons” by the Florida 
Rights Restoration Coalition and by activists working on these issues. This term will be used in 
this work out of respect and in acknowledgment of their work. Emily Bazelon, Will Florida’s Ex-
Felons Finally Regain the Right to Vote?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.ny 
times.com/2018/09/26/magazine/ex-felons-voting-rights-florida.html?action=click&module=in 
line&pgtype=Article [https://perma.cc/825Y-H7EK] (explaining that “returning citizens” is 
deliberately used in place of “felons” by the Florida Rights Restoration Coalition and by activists 
working on these issues). 
 3. Prior to the 2018 election, the four states that did not allow for the automatic restoration 
of voting rights to returning citizens that served their full sentence were Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, 
and Virginia. See FLA. CONST. art. 6, § 4 (1992); see also IOWA CONST. art 2, § 5; KY. CONST. 
§ 145; VA. CONST. art 2, § 1. 
 4. FLA. CONST. art. 6, § 4(a) (amended 2018). 
 5. Id. art. 6, § 4(b). 
 6. See generally Steve Bousquet, Koch-funded group supports voting rights for felons in 
Florida, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/ 
2018/09/13/koch-funded-group-supports-voting-rights-for-felons-in-florida/ [https://perma.cc/ 
CBB9-JLMA] (explaining how organizations from all political ideologies supported the voter 
restoration initiative). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Bazelon, supra note 2. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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submitted Senate Bill 7066.12 One purpose of this bill was to amend 
sections of the Florida statutes to define “completion of all terms of 
sentence.”13 This definition specified that restitution and court fines and 
fees must be paid to automatically restore the voting rights of an 
individual convicted of a felony outlined in Fla. Const. Art. VI § 4 (a).14 
Lawmakers that supported Senate Bill 7066 cited vague constitutional 
concerns and state control over elections as reasons they voted to pass the 
bill.15 The bill passed when lawmakers voted along party lines in May 
2019.16 Governor Ron DeSantis supported the bill throughout the 
legislative process and signed it into law in June 2019.17  
Although some lawmakers who supported Senate Bill 7066 were 
unconcerned about who the bill would affect,18 opponents of the bill 
explained throughout the legislative process it would disproportionately 
affect Black voters.19 Before Amendment Four, twenty percent of eligible 
Black voters could not vote because of their felony convictions.20 
Amendment Four and Senate Bill 7066, taken together, brought Florida 
into the national spotlight in the conversation about mass incarceration 
and disenfranchisement. 
 
 12. S.B. 7066, 2019 Leg., 121st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2019). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Janelle Ross, Amendment 4 in Florida restored voting rights to felons. Now that’s 
back in doubt, NBC NEWS (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/felon-voting-
rights-back-jeopardy-florida-n991146 [https://perma.cc/88JT-QZWB] (quoting Republican Rep. 
Jamie Grant’s confusing stance when he was asked whether he knew who would be impacted by 
the new bill: “I don’t want to know the impact of this because it’s irrelevant ... If truth and fact 
and intellectual honesty do not drive our discussion of things related to the Constitution, we have 
no hope”) (alteration in original); see also Gary Fineout, Florida GOP moves to rein in felon 
voting rights, POLITICO (May 2, 2019), https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2019/05/02/ 
florida-gop-moves-to-rein-in-felon-voting-rights-1005333 [https://perma.cc/4WBC-CV4D] 
(quoting Republican Sen. Rob Bradley who explained why he voted to pass the senate bill: “If 
they took money from you, if they broke in to your house and stole something that is valuable to 
you and your family and they have not paid it back, they have not completed their sentence”). 
 16. THE FLA. SENATE, CS/SB 7066: ELECTION ADMINISTRATION, https://www.flsenate.gov/ 
Session/Bill/2019/07066/?Tab=VoteHistory [https://perma.cc/MRM7-Y6D9] (last visited Nov. 
12, 2019). 
 17. Steven Lemongello, The Amendment 4 law: Questions and answers about fines, 
restitution and ‘poll taxes’ claims about the felon voting rights act, ORLANDO SENTINEL (July 
5, 2019, 12:27 PM) https://www.orlandosentinel.com/politics/os-ne-amendment-4-questions-
answers-20190703-jppm5c5knrhjte4tvvym3g7g5e-story.html [https://perma.cc/VN8Q-AWP3]. 
 18. See Ross, supra note 15 (“Grant said that he’d been asked repeatedly if he knows which 
Floridians would lose their right to vote due to his bill, or how many would be affected. He 
said, . . . ‘I don’t want to know the impact of this because it’s irrelevant . . . .’”). 
 19. Id. (explaining how opponents of Senate Bill 7066 framed their argument around the 
negative impact on Black voters). 
 20. Id. 
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Scholars in the United States have been developing a national 
conversation around mass incarceration and disenfranchisement.21 These 
conversations draw the historical connection from the emancipation of 
slaves to the disenfranchisement of the Black population today.22 
Recognizing the disparity today is clear; the difficulty lies in tracking 
how the legal system allows for disparity in the disenfranchisement of 
returning citizens. 
Black people are imprisoned at a disproportionately high rate for a 
myriad of reasons stemming from institutionalized racism in the criminal 
justice system.23 The United States imprisons 1,489,363 people.24 Thirty-
three percent of the U.S. prison population is Black.25 According to the 
2010 census, thirteen percent of the U.S. population is Black.26 This 
disproportionate rate of incarcerating Black people is also seen at the state 
level. Florida’s state prison population is 98,504.27 Forty-seven percent 
of the Floridian state prison population is Black,28 while seventeen 
percent of Florida’s population is Black.29 
Scholars turn to the Thirteenth Amendment to discuss how mass 
incarceration was intentionally designed to disproportionately affect 
Black people.30 Lawyers turn to the Fourteenth Amendment to discuss 
equal protection and due process protections in the face of racial 
 
 21. See generally GLAUDE, supra note 1 (discussing how race, mass incarceration, and 
democracy intersect); see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 197–201 (10th Anniversary ed. 2020) 
(discussing how mass incarceration impacts returning citizens’ ability to vote in a historical and 
global context). 
 22. See IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE BEGINNING: THE DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF 
RACIST IDEAS IN AMERICA 223–47 (2017) (explaining how the United States transitioned through 
the Civil War and Reconstruction by maintaining a racial hierarchy by denying basic civil rights 
to Black people). 
 23. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 21, at 15 (discussing how the United States has 
developed its current mass incarceration problem and how it disproportionately and intentionally 
impacts Black communities). 
 24.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 252156, PRISONERS IN 2017 at 1 (Apr. 2019), https://www.bjs 
.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf [https://perma.cc/83BE-XD76].  
 25. See id. at 17. 
 26. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION, CENSUS, APRIL 1, 2010 (2010), https://www.census 
.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/POP010210 [https://perma.cc/5VZG-7VYK] (including only 
monoracial Black or African American persons). 
 27. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 24, at 4. 
 28. Id. at 42. 
 29. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 26. 
 30. See, e.g., 13th, NETFLIX (2016), https://www.netflix.com/title/80091741 (featuring 
scholars who interpret the language of the 13th Amendment “[n]either slavery nor involuntary 
servitude, except as a punishment for crime . . . shall exist in the United States” as a legal loophole 
to reclassify Black people from slaves to criminals). 
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discrimination.31 In these analyses, the Fifteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution is largely ignored. When Florida enacted 
Senate Bill 7066, it created a unique contemporary constitutional issue. 
Shortly after Senate Bill 7066 was signed into law, five lawsuits 
representing seventeen plaintiffs were filed in the Northern District of 
Florida claiming the new law violated their constitutional rights.32 Each 
of the five suits seek relief under federal civil rights statutes, claiming the 
plaintiffs’ Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated.33 Only one suit made the argument that the Fifteenth 
Amendment also rendered the bill unconstitutional.34 The Northern 
District of Florida consolidated the five suits into Jones v. DeSantis.35 
During this litigation in federal court, Governor Ron DeSantis 
requested an advisory opinion from the Florida Supreme Court for its 
interpretation of “completion of all terms of sentence.”36 That court 
determined the “completion of all terms of sentence” “plainly refers to 
obligations and includes ‘all’—not some—[legal financial obligations] 
imposed in conjunction with an adjudication of guilt.”37 
On October 18, 2019, the Northern District of Florida ruled in favor 
of the plaintiffs, finding “[a]ccess to the franchise cannot be made to 
depend on an individual’s financial resources.”38 On November 15, 
2019, the governor appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.39 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Northern District of Florida, finding 
 
 31. The 14th Amendment provides, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
 32. Complaint, Mendez v. DeSantis, No. 4:19-cv-272 (N.D. Fla. filed June 15, 2019); 
Complaint, Gruver v. Barton, No. 1:19-cv-121 (N.D. Fla. filed June 28, 2019); Complaint, Jones 
v. DeSantis, No. 4:19-cv-300 (N.D. Fla. filed June 28, 2019); Complaint, Raysor v. Lee, No. 4:19-
cv-301 (N.D. Fla. filed June 28, 2019); Complaint, McCoy v. DeSantis, No. 4:19-cv-304 (N.D. 
Fla. filed July 1, 2019). 
 33. Complaint at 1–2, Mendez, Case 4:19-cv-00272-WS-CAS; Complaint at 4–6, Gruver, 
Case 1:19-cv-00121-MW-GRJ; Complaint at 1–2, Jones, Case 4:19-cv-00300-MW-MJF; 
Complaint at 3–4, Raysor, Case 4:19-cv-00301-MW-MJF; Complaint at 4, McCoy, Case 4:19-cv-
00304. 
 34. Complaint at 67–69, Gruver, Case 1:19-cv-00121-MW-GRJ. 
 35. Order Denying Mot. to Dismiss and Prelim. Injunction, Jones v. DeSantis, (Case 4:19-
cv-00300-RH-MJF), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180624, at *2 (N.D. Fla. filed June 28, 2019). 
 36. Letter from Gov. Ron DeSantis to Chief Justice Canady and the Justices of the Florida 
Sup. Ct. (Aug 9, 2019). 
37. Advisory Opinion to the Governor Re: Implementation of Amendment 4, The Voting 
Restoration Amendment, 288 So.3d 1070, 1075 (Fla. 2020). 
 38. Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1301 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (citing Johnson v. 
Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1216–17 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005)) (emphasis in original). 
 39. Jones v. DeSantis, 950 F.3d 795, 805 (11th Cir. 2020). 
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the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the proposed 
legislation violated returning citizens’ constitutional rights.40 
The governor then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, en banc, claiming 
that Senate Bill 7066 did not create wealth-based discrimination for 
returning citizens who wished to register to vote.41 Due to the immediacy 
of upcoming elections, the Jones plaintiffs sent a petition to the United 
States Supreme Court, who denied their application to vacate the stay 
placed by the Eleventh Circuit while the case was pending.42 On 
September 11, 2020, the Eleventh Circuit, en banc, sided with Florida 
and upheld Senate Bill 7066.43 The bill has been codified as Florida 
Statute § 98.0751 (2)(a)(5).44 Throughout the Jones saga, there was only 
one mention of the Fifteenth Amendment argument.45  
Florida Senate Bill 7066, which limits the primary purpose of Florida 
Constitution Article 6 § 4(a), is unconstitutional because it violates the 
Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. This Article will explore how the bill violates the 
Fifteenth Amendment. First, historical considerations of the Fifteenth 
Amendment show why the Fifteenth Amendment was drafted and how it 
was interpreted in the years following its ratification. Then, over time, 
Supreme Court decisions interpreted the class protections that the 
Amendment provides. This Article will argue that returning citizens 
belong to the classes protected under the Fifteenth Amendment.  
I.  THE HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 
The Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
“[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, 
or previous condition of servitude.”46 When the Amendment was first 
ratified, this right was interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to 
apply to emancipated slaves.47 Today, this right is interpreted as the basic 
 
 40. See id. at 829. 
 41. Brief of Defendants-Appellants, Jones v. DeSantis, 2020 WL 5493770 (11th Cir. June 
19, 2020), 2020 WL 3446227, at *12. 
 42. Raysor v. DeSantis, 140 S. Ct. 2600, 2600 (2020). In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor 
wrote, “This Court’s order prevents thousands of otherwise eligible voters from participating in 
Florida’s primary election simply because they are poor. . . . This Court’s inaction continues a 
trend of condoning disfranchisement.” Id. at 2600, 2603.  
 43. See Jones v. Governor of Fla., No. 20-12003, 2020 WL 5493770, at *9 (11th Cir. Sept. 
11, 2020). 
 44. See FLA. STAT. § 98.0751(2)(a)(5) (2019). This Article was originally written in Fall 
2019. For the purposes of this Article, the new statute will not be referenced. 
 45. See Complaint at 67–69, Gruver v. Barton, Case 1:19-cv-00121-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. 
filed June 28, 2019). 
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 47. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 512 (2000). 
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right for qualified individuals to exercise the right to vote, without racial 
discrimination.48  
A.  The Reconstruction Amendments Were Constructed to Appease 
Political Participants Into Reconstructing the United States After the 
Civil War 
Slavery was partially eradicated when the Thirteenth Amendment was 
ratified in 1865.49 Following the eradication of slavery, the United States 
government had to grapple with integrating a new population into society. 
This interest had to be weighed against re-integrating the states that 
seceded during the Civil War.50 To reconcile these two goals, lawmakers 
advocated the three Reconstruction Amendments.51 
The Reconstruction Amendments aimed to outlaw slavery, provide 
citizenship to emancipated slaves, and protect the voting rights of 
formerly enslaved individuals.52 Republican lawmakers strategically 
planned the wording of the three Amendments to appease their political 
base following the Civil War,53 expand their voting base,54 and eliminate 
their lingering postwar issues.55 These lawmakers knew the racial 
hierarchy in the South, and used this understanding throughout the Civil 
War and Reconstruction for political gain.56 With Republican lawmakers 
reluctant to permanently define what was meant through the 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. See W. E. B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION 188 (1935).  
 50. See KENDI, supra note 22, at 229–47 (explaining the transition from the Civil War into 
Reconstruction and the legal landscape Congress created). 
 51. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XIV, XV; see also Landmark Legislation: Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, & Fifteenth Amendments, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/ 
history/common/generic/CivilWarAmendments.htm [https://perma.cc/CVD3-SSJH] (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2020). 
 52. See KENDI, supra note 22, at 232, 241, 245. 
 53. See id. at 235 (discussing how the Thirteenth Amendment’s language “except as a 
punishment for crime” gave Southern politicians a way to rebuild the South to mimic antebellum 
society). 
 54. See id. at 245 (discussing why Republicans chose to support the Fifteenth Amendment 
as a way to maintain a political majority as Southern politicians returned to Congress). 
 55. See id. at 241 (explaining that Republicans used the Fourteenth Amendment to punish 
Confederates more than to create a failsafe constitutional Amendment to protect against racial 
discrimination). 
 56. For example, President Abraham Lincoln understood what the institution of slavery 
meant and worked to maintain the Union rather than protect enslaved individuals. See ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN, FIRST LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE, in THE PORTABLE ABRAHAM LINCOLN (Andrew 
Delbanco ed., 1992) (Lincoln expressed that he had “no purpose directly or indirectly to interfere 
with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists.”); see also ABRAHAM LINCOLN, LETTER 
TO HORACE GREELEY, AUGUST 22, 1862, in THE PORTABLE ABRAHAM LINCOLN (Andrew Delbanco 
ed., 1992) (“If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save 
it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others 
alone I would also do it.”). 
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Reconstruction Amendments,57 activists, former Confederates, and 
businesspeople rushed to the courts to define the scope of each of the 
Amendments.58 Of the three Amendments, the Fifteenth Amendment 
appears to have the least facial ambiguity. However, whether the 
Amendment was supposed to undeniably guarantee voting rights has 
been left to the court’s interpretation, as intended by lawmakers when the 
Amendment was written.59 
1.  During Reconstruction, the United States Supreme Court Limited the 
Fifteenth Amendment to Prevent Only State-Sponsored Voter Rights 
Discrimination 
During Reconstruction, the United States Supreme Court had three 
opportunities to interpret the Fifteenth Amendment.60 The first 
opportunity was the Slaughter-House Cases.61 The Slaughter-House 
Cases were actions brought by butchers in Louisiana challenging a state 
statute that limited the butchering trade.62 The butchers claimed the state 
statute violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.63 Here, the Supreme Court provided the first 
comprehensive evaluation of the three Reconstruction Amendments, 
taken together.64 
In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court hinted at the 
Fifteenth Amendment. It determined that formerly enslaved people were 
granted citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment.65 Because this 
class was granted citizenship, the class had the right to vote.66 The Court 
 
 57. See KENDI, supra note 22, at 241 (“Republicans did not deny Democrats’ charges that 
the [Fourteenth] Amendment was ‘open to ambiguity and . . . conflicting constructions.’”) 
(alteration in original). 
 58. See id. 
 59. See Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisement of 
Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 733–35 (1998) (discussing the various 
disenfranchisement efforts in the South post-enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment and the 
Supreme Court cases which overturned the de jure ballot exclusion). 
 60. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1873); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 
175 (1874); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875); see Jon Greenbaum, Alan Martinson 
& Sonia Gill, Shelby County v. Holder: When the Rational Becomes Irrational, 57 HOWARD L.J. 
811, 816 (2013–2014) (stating Reconstruction ended in 1876). 
 61. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71. 
 62. Id. at 57, 60. 
 63. Id. at 58. 
 64. Isaac Chotiner, The Buried Promise of the Reconstruction Amendments, NEW 
YORKER (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-buried-promise-of-the-
reconstruction-amendments [https://perma.cc/QJM6-QA3W] (“[S]tarting way back, even during 
Reconstruction with the Slaughterhouse Cases, in 1873, the Supreme Court began whittling away, 
narrowing the scope of the Reconstruction amendments . . . .”). 
 65. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71. 
 66. Id. 
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then explained the purpose of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments was to secure “the freedom of the slave race, the security 
and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-
made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had 
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.”67 
The Fifteenth Amendment was created to protect the voting rights of 
freed people.68 Collectively, the three Amendments protected the 
interests of emancipated slaves.69 The Fifteenth Amendment’s language 
is used by the Court in Slaughter-House to show that the protections 
preclude discrimination based on race, color, and previous condition of 
servitude.70 Further, the Court explicitly stated that the Fifteenth 
Amendment intended for all freed slaves to be able to vote: “The negro 
having, by the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, been declared to be a citizen 
of the United States, is thus made a voter in every State of the Union.”71 
This clear classification, and the novelty of the evaluation demonstrates 
that the Supreme Court in 1873 intended for Black people to have the 
right to vote. 
In the Slaughter-House Cases, the United States Supreme Court 
outlined the classes that the Reconstruction Amendments protect.72 The 
plaintiffs were white butchers in Louisiana challenging a state statute.73 
The Court explained that these Amendments, while providing new 
protections for all, were drafted to consider the integration of 
emancipated slaves into the new social order.74 The Court clarified that 
these Amendments were intended to apply the protections to people 
enslaved before the end of the Civil War.75 
The next time the Supreme Court could define the Fifteenth 
Amendment was in Minor v. Happersett.76 In Minor, a white woman was 
seeking relief because she was denied the right to register as a lawful 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 81 (“The existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated negroes 
resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the 
evil to be remedied . . . .”). 
 70. Id. at 71. 
 71. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1873) 
 72. Id. at 71–72. 
 73. Jonathan Lurie, Reflections on Justice Samuel F. Miller and the Slaughter-House Cases: 
Still a Meaty Subject, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 355, 367 (2005). 
 74. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71–72. 
 75. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 89–90 (“[The Thirteenth Amendment] prohibits 
slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime. . . . I have been so 
accustomed to regard it as intended to meet that form of slavery which had previously prevailed 
in this country, and to which the recent civil war owed its existence, that I was not prepared, nor 
am I yet, to give to it the extent and force ascribed by counsel.”). 
 76. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874). 
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voter in Missouri.77 The Court explained the concept of citizenship by 
defining what scope it will accept and where it is not yet prepared to go.78  
In Minor, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were considered 
together to determine suffrage rights.79 The Court determined that a child 
born in the United States, whose parents are citizens, is a citizen of the 
United States.80 It also outlined that it was not willing to reconcile the 
“doubts” as to whether “children born within the jurisdiction without 
reference to the citizenship of their parents” were citizens as well.81  
When the Court narrowed the question of which citizens were 
protected under the Fifteenth Amendment, it moved away from the 
specific class the Fifteenth Amendment was supposed to protect: 
emancipated slaves.82 The Fourteenth Amendment should have 
reconciled the doubts that the court was not willing to interpret because 
it outlined birthright citizenship. It is clear the Court understood this and 
ignored it because it references free white men’s ability to vote.83 With 
Minor, the new scope of the Fifteenth Amendment was that the 
“Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage 
upon any one, and that the constitutions and laws of the several States 
which commit that important trust to men alone are not necessarily 
void.”84  
The Slaughter-House Cases and Minor demonstrate the rush to the 
courts to define the scope of the Reconstruction Amendments. In both 
cases, white plaintiffs were using the ambiguous language to define the 
Amendments in such a way to expand their own political agenda. 
Slaughter-House was used to challenge the overall Reconstruction 
process85 while Minor was used to advocate for universal suffrage for 
white women.86 Each case tried to clarify the scope of the Reconstruction 
Amendments to show how the ambiguous language created emerging 
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 85. Lurie, supra note 77, at 359–66. 
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Restoring the Constitutional Right to Vote Shelby County v. Holder, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
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issues.87 They also tried to force the Court to clarify the protected classes 
for the Amendments.88 
The last case considered during Reconstruction that defined the 
Fifteenth Amendment was United States v. Reese.89 Reese concerned a 
criminal investigation against two inspectors that refused to count the 
vote of William Garner.90 William Garner was a Black man in Kentucky 
who tried to participate in a local election.91 The question before the 
Court was whether the Fifteenth Amendment provides a mechanism to 
punish those who discriminate against others who wish to vote.92 The 
discrimination had to be based on the protected classes of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.93  
The Court reasoned that the Fifteenth Amendment protects those 
wishing to engage in the elective process.94 It found that while the 
Amendment provides this protection, it does not outline a punishment for 
those who discriminate.95 The Fifteenth Amendment is defined as “not 
confer[ing] the right of suffrage upon any one. It prevents the States, or 
the United States . . . from giving preference . . . to one citizen of the 
United States over another on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude.”96 The Court concluded that Garner did not have 
an affirmative right to vote through the Fifteenth Amendment.97 It also 
stated that neither Congress nor the Fifteenth Amendment outlines 
punishment for violating the Fifteenth Amendment.98 So, those who 
discriminate in states where Black people may not vote could not be 
punished. 99 
The shift from Slaughter-House to Minor to Reese demonstrates that 
jurists of the time aligned ideologically with the executive branch.100 
Legislators were concerned with gaining power: Southern Confederates 
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were concerned with regaining the power they had before the war; 
Northern Unionists were concerned with rebuilding the Union and 
holding the rebellious states accountable.101 As president, Ulysses Grant 
was determined to stay moderate about Black suffrage.102 He stated that 
Northerners believed that “there would be a time of probation, in which 
the ex-slaves could prepare themselves for the privileges of citizenship 
before the full right would be conferred.”103 Grant stated that he was 
prepared to follow that thinking, had it not been for his predecessor, 
President Andrew Johnson, becoming sympathetic to Southern 
politicians.104 To preserve the Union, and to balance control, President 
Grant “favored immediate enfranchisement.”105 
Slaughter-House was decided by the Chase Court (1864–1873) while 
the Waite Court (1874–1888) decided Minor and Reese.106 The Court’s 
reasoning remained consistent in trying to “moderately” protect the civil 
rights of African Americans.107 In cases such as Reese, the Waite Court 
opened up loopholes where civil rights could be limited by the states.108 
But in cases like Slaughter-House, the Chase Court maintained that the 
Reconstruction Amendments were to protect the civil rights of freed 
slaves and Black people.109 During Reconstruction, the Court “upheld 
civil rights principles in important cases,”110 but it did not take the 
opportunity to prevent legal loopholes for the states to ignore federal 
law.111 
The Waite Court attempted to close these loopholes in two cases that 
alluded to the new constitutional provisions, but did not directly interpret 
them.112 In both Ex parte Yarbrough and United States v. Cruikshank, the 
Supreme Court was reviewing the criminal convictions of white men 
accused of harassing Black men attempting to exercise their civil 
rights.113 In both cases, the Court seemed to interpret the Fifteenth 
Amendment as providing Black men with the right to vote in state 
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elections.114 The Court maintained its pseudo-commitment in upholding 
civil rights by including the language that indicated that the Fifteenth 
Amendment guaranteed protection against race-based voter 
discrimination.115 This commitment was not effective, however, as both 
cases are largely ignored.116 
After Reconstruction, lawyers looked toward limiting the Fifteenth 
Amendment by narrowing the legal standard that had to be met to show 
a voting practice was unconstitutional.117 As litigation related to the 
Fifteenth Amendment proceeded, the protections provided by the 
Amendment became obsolete. 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT CLASS 
PROTECTIONS 
When the Supreme Court decided Slaughter-House, Minor, Reese, 
and Cruikshank, the only definitive interpretation of the Fifteenth 
Amendment it provided was there shall be no state-sponsored voter 
discrimination based on race.118 In these decisions, the Court proved 
capable of understanding how Southern ideals and white supremacy 
would, and did, prevent Black people from voting.119 However, the Court 
failed to interpret another critical piece of the Fifteenth Amendment: 
“[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged . . . on account of . . . previous condition of servitude.”120 From 
its enactment to today, the Fifteenth Amendment’s narrow interpretation 
has caused it to lose its power and has prevented it from protecting the 
rights of the individuals it is supposed to protect.121 
A.  The Class the Fifteenth Amendment Protects Changed Over Time to 
Consider Only Race-Based Voter Discrimination 
After Reconstruction, the Supreme Court gradually considered 
whether voting rights were fundamental, and if they were, who could 
participate. Ex parte Yarbrough provided the Court the opportunity to 
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clear up its confusing interpretation of the Fifteenth Amendment, while 
also providing space for the Court to think about how race would affect 
voting rights.122  
In 1883, Berry Saunders, a Black man, tried to participate in Georgia’s 
congressional election.123 Three white men disguised themselves and 
assaulted Saunders.124 The men were arrested and convicted for 
conspiring to violate Saunders’ constitutional rights.125 In Ex parte 
Yarbrough, the Supreme Court reviewed the convictions and sentences 
to determine whether a constitutional violation occurred.126 In this 
review, the Court considered the Fifteenth Amendment post-
Reconstruction.127 
In Ex parte Yarbrough, the Court reviewed the Fifteenth Amendment 
to determine “the constitutional authority for federal legislation 
concerning” voting rights and the right to vote in congressional 
elections.128 The Court determined that the Fifteenth Amendment 
“clearly shows that the right of suffrage was considered to be of supreme 
importance to the national government, and was not intended to be left 
within the exclusive control of the states.”129 It also reasoned that the right 
to vote was “[guaranteed] by the Constitution and should be kept free and 
pure by congressional enactments whenever that is necessary.”130 The 
Court emphasized that the Fifteenth Amendment was intended to protect 
people of African descent.131 The Court inadvertently placed a narrow 
limitation on precisely what harm must be shown to establish a Fifteenth 
Amendment violation.132 The Court’s language also provided a 
foundation to explain how voting is a fundamental right. 
Ex parte Yarbrough provided a foundation for the idea that voting is 
a fundamental right. It explained that the Fifteenth Amendment provided 
a mechanism to protect African Americans and designed a way to ensure 
they enjoyed a basic civil right:  
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This new constitutional right [explained in United States v. 
Reese] was mainly designed for citizens of African descent. 
The principle, however, that the protection of the exercise of 
this right is within the power of Congress, is as necessary to 
the right of other citizens to vote as to the colored citizen, 
and to the right to vote in general as to the right to be 
protected against discrimination. The exercise of the right in 
both instances is guaranteed by the Constitution, and should 
be kept free and pure by congressional enactments whenever 
that is necessary. . . . For, while it may be true that acts which 
are mere invasions of private rights, which acts have no 
sanction in the statutes of a State, or which are not committed 
by any one exercising its authority, are not within the scope 
of that amendment, it is quite a different matter when 
Congress undertakes to protect the citizen in the exercise of 
rights conferred by the Constitution of the United States 
essential to the healthy organization of the government 
itself.133 
Taken alone, Ex parte Yarbrough would not be persuasive because of 
the precedent provided during Reconstruction. However, the year after 
Ex parte Yarbrough, the Supreme Court expanded this foundation with 
its decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.134 In Yick Wo, the Supreme Court 
stated that voting, “[t]hough not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as 
a privilege merely conceded by society according to its will, under certain 
conditions, nevertheless it is regarded as a fundamental political right, 
because preservative of all rights.”135 Together, Ex parte Yarbrough and 
Yick Wo evidence the Court’s acceptance that voting is a fundamental 
right.136 However, the Court was unclear about the proper enforcement 
mechanism for ensuring all men could exercise the right.137 
After Yick Wo, litigation about the Fifteenth Amendment arose 
together with other constitutional violations including poll taxing138 and 
gerrymandering.139 In these cases, the Court dealt with the Fifteenth 
Amendment in idealistic terms. At no point did it consider further 
defining which classes were protected by the Amendment.140 The Court 
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has failed to recognize that previous condition of servitude constitutes a 
class distinct from racial classification and should also be protected under 
the Fifteenth Amendment. 
B.  The Fifteenth Amendment was Intended to Also Protect the Rights of 
Returning Citizens 
The Fifteenth Amendment declares that voting rights are protected 
based on “race, color, and previous condition of servitude.”141 In cases 
like Slaughterhouse and Yick Wo, race and color were defined for 
purposes of determining whether discrimination has occurred. The 
Supreme Court has only discussed the definition of “previous condition 
of servitude” to address emancipated people of African descent after the 
Civil War.142 However, focusing on this narrow definition is to only 
understand United States history as a moment of transition from the 
antebellum to the post-Civil War era.  
The Thirteenth Amendment provided a loophole allowing slavery to 
continue existing in the United States. The Amendment states “[n]either 
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”143 Following the 
Civil War, Southern landowners faced a dilemma: finding a labor force 
to replace the enslaved people that previously farmed the crops.144 
Southern states responded to this dilemma by developing laws and 
practices to regulate labor.145 Collectively, the responsive laws passed 
during the Reconstruction era were known as Black Codes.146 
The Black Codes allowed the legacy of slavery to continue after 
enslaving humans was declared illegal. Many laws codified in these 
codes existed in the antebellum South.147 The codes followed the Georgia 
model, which came after the Mississippi and South Carolina Codes.148 
The Georgia Code had four main elements: “enticement, vagrancy, 
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apprenticeship, and criminalized trespass.”149 The post-bellum codes 
were different because they were race-neutral and did not apply 
exclusively to people of African descent according to the black letter 
law.150 However, the landowning class coerced emancipated people into 
labor and poverty.151 
The vagrancy provisions of the Black Codes are one of the direct links 
from slavery to the legal loophole created by the Thirteenth 
Amendment.152 Vagrancy statutes forced emancipated people into work: 
Vagrancy was defined broadly, allowing sheriffs and judges 
to force black people into work. Mississippi defined the 
“idle” as vagrants, without requiring a showing that the 
vagrant was destitute. Also, vagrants included “persons who 
neglect their calling or employment, [or] misspend what they 
earn.” In Alabama, vagrants were defined to include 
“stubborn servant[s].” Even attempts to demand higher 
wages could risk a charge of vagrancy. Virginia defined 
vagrancy to include refusing “the usual and common wages 
given to other laborers.” While vagrancy statutes might be 
race-blind, one planter, former slaveowner, and Klansman 
noted, “[t]he vagrant contemplated was the plantation 
negro.”153 
One punishment for violating vagrancy laws was that vagrants were 
bound to a term of servitude.154 Another punishment was that those who 
were convicted were ordered to pay either a fine or court cost.155 Failure 
to pay these fines could cause the convicted person to be forced into 
performing public work for the county.156 The worst punishment was that 
a violating individual could be convicted of a misdemeanor and sentenced 
to a state or county chain gang.157  
When contemplating the Black Codes and the emerging labor laws, 
southern lawmakers considered whether the statutes would create civil 
wrongs or criminal offenses.158 Ten of the eleven states that enacted these 
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new laws made the statutes criminal offenses.159 For example, in 1867, 
two-thirds of Texas prisoners were white “but 90 percent of those hired 
out were black.”160 By 1930, thirty-seven percent of Georgia’s state 
population was Black.161 That prison population was eighty-three percent 
Black by 1932.162 Of that population, ninety percent of Black people 
convicted of felonies were sentenced to chain gangs and ninety-five 
percent of Black people convicted of misdemeanors were sentenced to 
county labor.163  
The driving force of antebellum slavery was free labor, and the driving 
force behind the post-bellum labor laws was to maintain a cheap labor 
force.164 Lawmakers took advantage of the loophole in the Thirteenth 
Amendment by creating laws that criminalized behaviors that challenged 
the system to maintain cheap labor.165 With the direct link between 
antebellum slavery and the new penal system that essentially created 
slavery by another name, the definition of the phrase “previous condition 
of servitude” cannot only apply to emancipated slaves. The phrase 
“previous condition of servitude,” as provided in the Constitution,166 
should also apply to returning citizens or individuals convicted of felonies 
who have served their prison sentence and finished their probation.  
III.  FLORIDA SENATE BILL 7066 VIOLATES THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Florida Senate Bill 7066 violates the Fifteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution because it abridges the right of returning 
citizens to vote. Federal law allows a civil action when any “person who, 
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws.”167 To prevail on a civil action for the deprivation of right under 42 
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U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) “the defendant has deprived him 
of a right secured by the ‘Constitution and laws’ of the United States” and 
(2) “the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right . . . ‘under 
color of law.’”168 Returning citizens disenfranchised by Senate Bill 7066 
have a claim under federal law because they meet the burden of proof for 
both elements. 
Returning citizens meet the first element because they are a class 
protected under the Fifteenth Amendment whose right to vote is being 
abridged by virtue of their status as returning citizens. In Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation,169 
the Supreme Court provided a mechanism to prove discriminatory intent 
even if a law appears facially neutral. To identify discriminatory intent, a 
court may consider the following factors: (1) whether the law 
disproportionately affects one race over another; (2) the historical 
background of the law; (3) the specific event sequence leading to the law; 
(4) departure from normal procedural sequence; and (5) the legislative 
history, including “contemporary statements by members of the 
decision[-]making body, minutes of its meetings, or reports.”170 
Returning citizens also meet the second element under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
given that the named defendants in the federal case are state officials 
working in their official capacities. 
To succeed in proving a Section 1983 claim under the Fifteenth 
Amendment, returning citizens can show discriminatory intent based on 
race, color, and previous condition of servitude. These classes are 
protected under the Constitution, and Florida Senate Bill 7066 
disenfranchises individuals for belonging to those classes. Without 
litigation, returning citizens can show two of the Arlington Heights 
factors: the disproportionate impact and the discriminatory history of the 
law. 
Before Amendment Four passed in the 2018 general election, more 
than ten percent “of Florida’s voting population—nearly 1.7 million as of 
2016”—could not vote.171 More than twenty percent of all eligible Black 
Floridian voters were disenfranchised because of the restrictions placed 
on returning citizens. 172 In 2016, sixteen percent of Florida’s population 
was Black.173 Black people also made up thirty-three percent of returning 
citizens that were disenfranchised.174 Black Floridians face 
disproportionate disenfranchisement because they are “more likely to be 
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arrested, charged, convicted, and face harsher sentences than white 
Floridians.”175  
The disparity in the Florida prison population can be explained by 
multiple factors. One historical explanation links the labor laws of the 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.176 Florida is one of the 
states that enacted a series of labor laws in 1865.177 The state engaged in 
convict leasing until the 1920s.178 As in other states, Florida’s 
enforcement of labor laws disproportionately affected individuals of 
African descent.179 
Before Senate Bill 7066, disenfranchising returning citizens violated 
the Fifteenth Amendment. The provision requiring returning citizens to 
pay fines and fees before regaining the right to vote further violates the 
Fifteenth Amendment because it disproportionately affects Black 
returning citizens.180 In an expert study done to analyze the current 
system of monitoring and recording payment of fines and fees, Dr. Daniel 
A. Smith found eighty-two percent of individuals subject to Senate Bill 
7066 would be disenfranchised.181 Of that percentage, Black returning 
citizens would be disproportionately impacted by the law as compared to 
their white counterparts.182 Regardless of this disparity, if courts can 
agree that there is a direct link between the current system of mass 
incarceration and the end of antebellum slavery, then the entire class of 
returning citizens can claim protection under the Fifteenth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
In 2018, voters made a bold statement by passing Amendment Four 
in Florida’s general election. This statement was a clear declaration that 
the right to vote and participate in the political process is precious. This 
statement was bipartisan and clear. Current attempts to limit the power of 
Amendment Four through Senate Bill 7066 and subsequent measures 
currently being considered mimic the strategies used after the ratification 
of the Reconstruction Amendments to limit and shape their interpretation.  
Though federal courts generally defer to state law when it comes to 
voting rights, Senate Bill 7066 cannot be ignored because it violates the 
Fifteenth Amendment. The Fifteenth Amendment protects voting rights 
based on race, color, and previous condition of servitude. To understand 
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these protections is to understand how Southern society was established 
and maintained on a racial hierarchy. To protect the rights of all returning 
citizens is to imagine a new path to a democracy that does not uphold 
historical prejudices. Federal courts today can choose a new path. They 
can choose to understand and accept how the disparities that impact Black 
communities due to the system of mass incarceration are a continuation 
of the racial hierarchy of the antebellum south. To find that Senate Bill 
7066 violates the Fifteenth Amendment is to take a step forward in 
protecting the rights for all citizens to access democracy. 
 
 
